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SECOND-BEST FREE EXERCISE
Christopher C. Lund*
The future of the Free Exercise Clause is up in the air. Thirty years ago,
in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held the Free Exercise
Clause only protected against religious discrimination and did not require
exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws.
Yet despite having an official rule against religious exemptions, the
Roberts Court has somehow managed to give religious exemptions in case
after case. This illustrates Smith’s waning power—the case has become
more of an obstacle for courts to work around than a precedent for courts to
obey. But these victories have also come to shape free exercise doctrine in
ways that few could have predicted and in ways the Smith Court might not
even recognize.
The Court’s new regime has many positive features. Its recent cases
awarding religious exemptions have been based on a robust theory of
equality that has genuine normative appeal. But these pluses go hand in
hand with some negatives and some question marks. Smith’s core concepts
have become deeply indeterminate and thus manipulable; other features
make it particularly hard for religious minorities to bring claims; underneath
it all lies the fact that general applicability is a concept that turns heavily on
arbitrary factors, introducing a great deal of sheer luck into the process.
Concerns about judicial restraint and federalism have been totally lost, and
open judicial balancing of interests—the one thing Smith most sought to
avoid—has been tacitly reintroduced through the back door.
The Roberts Court has been making lemonade out of the lemon it was
given, which is understandable. But the Court’s new theory of free exercise
is a theory of the second best, and it bears the familiar scars of such theories.
The Court could move to the narrowest form of Smith, one centered around
intentional discrimination, which would be conceptually clean but would
basically mark the end of free exercise. Another approach, and a better one,
would be to throw off Smith’s shackles and dive back into a regime of
religious exemptions. But either way, probably the one thing most difficult
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paper also benefited greatly from comments received when it was presented at Yale Law
School’s Free Exercise Speaker Series and the Nootbaar Fellows Program at Pepperdine
University Rick J. Caruso School of Law.
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to imagine is that the Free Exercise Clause will stay the same for much
longer.
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INTRODUCTION
Free exercise is in the middle of a revolution. Long neglected, the free
exercise of religion has quickly become the favorite child of the Roberts
Court. Last year, for example, the Court ruled that Philadelphia could not
terminate its partnership with Catholic Social Services for refusing to work
with gay couples seeking to adopt,1 and it issued a raft of orders giving
churches special rights to open in the face of quarantine orders related to the
COVID-19 pandemic.2 In earlier years, the Court protected a religious baker
who refused to make a cake for a gay wedding,3 immunized religious schools
from employment claims brought by their religious teachers,4 and exempted
religiously run corporations from having to provide contraceptive coverage

1. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
2. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam) (exempting in-home
religious gatherings from California’s prohibition on having more than three families in a
home); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (exempting
religious organizations from California’s rules limiting indoor capacity); Roman Cath.
Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (exempting religious organizations from
New York’s rules limiting indoor capacity).
3. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
4. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
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to their employees.5 Religious claimants bringing free exercise claims have
won many remarkable victories.6
The Roberts Court has managed to reach all these very protective results,
despite having inherited some very unprotective free exercise doctrine. Since
the 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,7 the Supreme Court’s
official position has been that the Free Exercise Clause only forbids religious
discrimination, and so it is generally up to legislatures, not courts, to give
religious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws.8 Some
Supreme Court justices have grumbled about Smith, and various exceptions
have been carved from it.9 Even so, Smith remains the core of free exercise
jurisprudence.
So despite having an official rule against religious exemptions, the Roberts
Court has somehow managed to keep giving religious exemptions in case
after case. The Court has been able to do this by developing a powerful and
conceptually elaborate set of new rules about what counts as discrimination.
These new rules all make sense, and they certainly ameliorate some of
Smith’s harsh effects. But they also warp the doctrinal fabric of free
exercise.10 This piece sees five issues as being of particular importance:
(1) the concern of manipulation, (2) the risk of going too far, (3) the return
of balancing, (4) the problem of constitutional luck, and (5) the plight of
religious minorities.

5. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
6. In fact, if one looks at the cases the Supreme Court has decided on their merits
(ignoring the so-called “shadow docket” rulings), religious claimants have not lost an
exemption case since 1997. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating
part of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). This includes not only claims under
the Free Exercise Clause, but also claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). In
fairness, though, there was Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011), which limited prisoners’
claims under RLUIPA to injunctive relief.
7. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8. See id. at 879 (holding that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability . . . .’” (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
9. This grumbling was most recently seen in a concurrence in which three justices said
they would overrule Smith. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021)
(Alito, J., concurring). The exceptions have been both legislative and judicial. See Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190
(2012) (confirming the existence of the ministerial exception and distinguishing Smith as
being inapplicable to “internal church decision[s] that affect[] the faith and mission of the
church itself”).
10. Professor Tom Berg sees the same progression in gay rights cases like Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), and United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), which produced
minimalist holdings based on conceptions of discrimination that may or may not make much
sense doctrinally, yet pave the way toward a broader, more defensible substantive right that
will come later. See Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious
Objectors?, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139.
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First, there is a concern about manipulation. In working around Smith’s
somewhat ironclad rule against exemptions, the Court has made a number of
free exercise’s core concepts—like what counts as a “rule” or an “exception”
to the rule, or what the appropriate level of generality is—fuzzy and
susceptible to results-oriented reasoning.11 Second, and relatedly, having so
greatly loosened the shackles of Smith, many paths have become open to the
Court, creating real risks the Court might go too far with free exercise.12
Third, balancing has returned to free exercise analysis in ways that the Smith
Court would have rejected.13 Not only must judges now openly make
somewhat discretionary decisions about the nature and weight of the
governmental interest in question, they also must tacitly make somewhat
discretionary decisions about the nature and weight of the religious interest
in question as well.14 Fourth, at the bottom of Smith is an ugly truth—
because Smith’s structure works by accommodating religious needs when
some analogous secular need has been accommodated through the political
process, religious liberty now hinges on the vagaries of whether religious
needs just happen to overlap with nonreligious needs.15 This problem—the
problem of “constitutional luck”—has not even been addressed, let alone
dealt with.16 And fifth and finally, there is the continuing plight of religious
minorities.17 The Court has been working Smith over hard to protect
religious liberty.18 But various structural reasons, especially when combined
with some unintended facets of the Court’s recent decisions, mean that
traditional religious minorities (like Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and others) will
likely get less out of the new Free Exercise Clause than other groups.19
When it comes to free exercise, the Supreme Court has been working out
a theory of the second best. Smith has distorted free exercise in such a way
that, as long as the Court stays within Smith, it can fix the distortions only by
creating others. Twenty years ago, I remarked that “[f]ree exercise can either
grow into a full-fledged substantive right or devolve into a simple prohibition
on intentional discrimination, but the current arrangement is a primitive
attempt to split the difference that is completely out of accord with our
intuitions and that will ultimately satisfy neither side.”20 I was overconfident
both in my analysis and my prescriptions, but I still think I got a lot of it right,
and we now have another two decades’ worth of evidence for it. In other

11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra Part II.D.
17. See infra Part II.E.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.E.
20. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 664–65
(2003).
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work, I have pressed the case that Smith should be overruled.21 That, and not
this, is probably the Court’s best direction forward.22
I. UNPACKING THE NEW FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Free Exercise Clause is in the middle of a remarkable transformation.
In case after case, the Roberts Court has given religious exemptions to
believers, despite having inherited (and preserved) a jurisprudence whose
master principle was that courts should not give religious exemptions.23
Each of the Court’s decisions makes some sense on its own terms. But when
examined collectively and looked at critically, hidden tensions and vexing
questions begin to appear.
A. The Ancient History: Smith and Lukumi
Histories of the Free Exercise Clause tend to center around one case in
particular—the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v.
Smith. Smith asked whether members of the Native American Church had a
constitutional right to use peyote in their religious rituals, despite an Oregon
law generally forbidding peyote use. Before Smith, the Court had operated
under a strict-scrutiny test somewhat warm to religious exemptions24 under
which substantial burdens on free exercise had to be justified by compelling
governmental interests.25 More demanding on paper than in practice, this
compelling-interest test nevertheless gave the Court enough discretion to
give religious exemptions in cases it found sufficiently sympathetic.26
Smith changed everything. It not only rejected the Native American
Church’s claim for an exemption to the peyote laws, it rejected religious
exemptions in general.27 Religious claimants could ask legislatures for
21. See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163 (2016); Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and
Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious
Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 466 (2010) [hereinafter
Lund, A Look at State RFRAs].
22. I offer more on the direction I would take free exercise in an upcoming symposium
piece, Christopher C. Lund, Answers to Fulton’s Questions, 108 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2023) (on file with author).
23. See infra Parts I.A–B.
24. The test was sometimes referred to as the Sherbert-Yoder test, named after the core
cases. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25. To be sure, there were three elements in this test—substantial burdens, compelling
state interests, and least restrictive means. For a representative explanation of the test, see
Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify
an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest.”).
26. Apart from Sherbert and Yoder, see supra note 24, the Court also gave exemptions in
three other cases. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. 707.
27. More precisely, Smith held that burdens on religious exercise required no justification,
as long as the laws in question were “neutral” and “generally applicable.” See Emp. Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
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exemptions, the Court said, but they had no constitutional right to them.28 In
subsequent years, exceptions have been made to Smith, both by legislatures29
and by the Supreme Court.30 But Smith’s general rule—that courts should
not give exemptions from laws that are “neutral” and “generally
applicable”31—still dominates the jurisprudential landscape. If there is one
rule to know, Smith is it. Last I checked, the bar review companies do not
teach anything else about free exercise.
Three years after Smith, the Supreme Court returned to the Free Exercise
Clause in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,32 where
a congregation of Santería practitioners sought to sacrifice animals in
religious rituals in the face of a set of ordinances passed by the city of Hialeah
to stop exactly that.33
Lukumi unanimously held for the Santería, concluding that Hialeah’s
ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable.34 The ordinances
were not neutral, the Court said, because they had been passed deliberately
to burden Santería religious practice.35 And they were not generally
applicable, the Court said, because Hialeah made exceptions to those
ordinances for a variety of other kinds of killings.36 For while Hialeah
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))). In Smith, the Court did make some exceptions
for individualized exemptions and hybrid rights. See id. at 881–82. But those exceptions were
small ones and did not threaten the rule—at least, until recently. For a fuller explanation of
these mechanics, see James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)honesty, 2019 WIS. L. REV.
689, 725–26.
28. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
29. In 1993, Congress passed RFRA, which restores religious exemptions at the federal
level. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.). In 2000, Congress passed
RLUIPA, which restores religious exemptions from state and local law in the special contexts
of land use law and prisons. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
And on top of that, a number of states have restored exemptions through state statutes or
interpretations of their state constitutions. See Lund, A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 21.
30. The key decision here is the Court’s decision confirming the existence of the
“ministerial exception”—a constitutional doctrine immunizing churches from employment
suits brought by their clergy. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (holding that Smith does not apply to an “internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself”); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.
v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (expanding the breadth of the ministerial
exception).
31. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80.
32. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
33. One such ordinance, for example, required people not to “unnecessarily kill, torment,
torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary
purpose of food consumption.” Id. at 526–27 (quoting Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-52 (Sept.
8, 1987)).
34. See id. at 524.
35. Id. at 540 (“[T]he ordinances were enacted ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ their
suppression of Santeria religious practice . . . .”). The Court drew this conception of neutrality
from its equal protection cases, citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
36. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536–38.
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forbade killing animals in Santería rituals, it allowed a wide variety of other
kinds of animal killings—for food, clothing, pest control, fishing, hunting,
pet euthanasia, and so on. These kinds of killings threatened the city’s stated
interests as much as the Santería’s killings would.37 This was a form of
unequal treatment, the Court explained, and “[t]he Free Exercise Clause
‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.’”38
Smith and Lukumi essentially stand on opposite ends of the spectrum. The
law in Smith was neutral and generally applicable; the law in Lukumi was
anything but. Left to draw the line between them, courts found the most help
in Lukumi, where the Supreme Court centered the issue around notions of
secular exceptions and underinclusiveness.39 Basically, if a law makes no
exceptions for other kinds of conduct (i.e., secular conduct), then it is
generally applicable and no claim for a religious exemption is possible. But
if a law makes exceptions for secular kinds of conduct, and if those secular
exceptions threaten the government’s interest as much as a religious
exception would, that essentially amounts to religious discrimination and
justifies a religious exemption.40
This conception of discrimination has intuitive appeal. It does indeed
seem like discrimination when the government prohibits religious activities
but permits secular equivalents—like when a school allows a girl to wear a
baseball cap but not a hijab.41 And, in a deep sense, the doctrine must be this
37. Id. at 544 (“The health risks posed by the improper disposal of animal carcasses are
the same whether Santeria sacrifice or some nonreligious killing preceded it.”); see also
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 207–08 (2004) (“The
ordinances’ lack of general applicability was shown by their collective failure to prohibit
secular killings of animals—analogous secular conduct outside the scope of the ordinances—
and also by their failure to prohibit other secular conduct, not analogous as conduct, that
caused analogous harmful consequences.”).
38. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
39. To be sure, some courts initially took a narrower approach, conceiving of
Smith-Lukumi as imposing a simple ban on intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1999) (asking whether the
lawmakers in question “were impelled by a desire to target or suppress religious exercise”).
This was probably not a persuasive reading of Lukumi. See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme
Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 28 (2000) (“Whatever else it may be, Lukumi
is not a motive case. The lead opinion explicitly relies on the city’s motive to exclude a
particular religious group—and that part of the opinion has only two votes. So whatever the
holding is, it is not a holding about motive.”). But, in any event, it has been superseded by the
Supreme Court’s most recent cases. See infra Part I.B.
40. See Lund, supra note 20, at 637 (noting that “[a]s long as a law remains exceptionless,
then it is considered generally applicable, and religious claimants cannot claim a right to be
exempt from it,” but when “a law has secular exceptions . . . a challenge by a religious
claimant becomes possible”). As Professor Nelson Tebbe notes, this understanding of
Smith-Lukumi found support from a surprisingly diverse coalition. See Nelson Tebbe, The
Principle and Politics of Equal Value, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2397, 2405 & nn.38–39 (2021)
(making this point and providing citations).
41. Of course, the crucial thing will be deciding which secular activities count as
equivalents. As Justice Kagan eventually put it, “the law does not require that the State equally
treat apples and watermelons.” Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1298 (2021) (per curiam)
(Kagan, J., dissenting); cf. Mark Storslee, The Covid-19 Church-Closure Cases and the Free
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way, for there is probably no other way that an antidiscrimination right could
go beyond religious status to protect religious conduct. Moreover, this
approach has practical virtues—it gives religious minorities a kind of
vicarious protection in the legislative process. Religious minorities can
piggyback on battles fought by secular interest groups in the political
branches. If those secular groups get an exemption, religious minorities do
too.42
Despite some downsides that will be explored later, one can see the power
and attractiveness of this “most favored nation” theory of free exercise in
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark,43 an
influential opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
written by then Judge Alito. There, two Muslim policemen challenged a
department policy requiring them to shave, on grounds that they had a
religious obligation to grow beards. Their claim succeeded because of a
different exception made by the police department. Before the issue arose
with the Muslim officers, the department had allowed other officers to wear
beards when they had a particular medical condition making it painful to
shave.44 Seeing this as the kind of discrimination barred by Lukumi,
Fraternal Order gave the Muslim officers their requested exemption.45
B. The Modern History: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Tandon, and Fulton
For more than twenty years, little changed about this basic picture. The
Supreme Court decided various cognate issues. It addressed when religious
exemptions should be awarded under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 199346 (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 200047 (RLUIPA);48 it addressed the scope of other statutory religious
Exercise of Religion, 37 J.L. & RELIGION 72, 78 (2022) (pointing out “just how hard it can be
to identify which activities are truly ‘comparable,’ at least when the underlying controversy
relates to highly technical questions like disease transmission”).
42. As Professors Douglas Laycock and Steven Collis put it: “Small religious minorities
will rarely have the political clout to defeat a burdensome law or regulation. But if that
regulation also burdens other, more powerful interests, there will be stronger opposition and
the regulation is less likely to be enacted.” Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally
Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 25 (2016); see also
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Freedom amid the Tumult, 17 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 735, 738–40
(2022) (offering a similar account).
43. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). The phrase “most favored nation status” was first coined
in Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49–50.
44. See Fraternal Order, 170 F.3d at 360 (noting this medical exception was made
principally for officers with “a skin condition called pseudo folliculitis barbae”).
45. As the Court put it, “the Department has provided no legitimate explanation as to why
the presence of officers who wear beards for medical reasons does not have this effect [of
undermining the government’s interest] but the presence of officers who wear beards for
religious reasons would.” Id. at 366.
46. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 and 42 U.S.C.).
47. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
48. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (RLUIPA); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (RFRA); Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) (RLUIPA);
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exemptions;49 and it carved an important exception from Smith in
Hosanna-Tabor, the ministerial exception case.50 But for a full generation,
the Court left the basic structure of the Free Exercise Clause untouched. In
the past five years, though, this has changed dramatically. The Court has
returned to the Free Exercise Clause as if hungry for it. Later, this Article
considers the cumulative effect of the Court’s decisions in a critical light.51
But before that, it addresses them individually.
1. Masterpiece Cakeshop: “Exceptions,” “Rules,” and the
Level of Generality
In retrospect, the first sign everything was going to change came in 2018,
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.52 There, a couple seeking a cake for
their wedding was turned away by the cakeshop owner, Jack Phillips, who
objected on religious grounds to creating a cake for a gay wedding.53 The
couple sued Phillips for unlawful discrimination. But, in a 7–2 decision, the
Supreme Court said it was Phillips himself who had been discriminated
against, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.54 The Court based its
conclusion partly on negative comments made about Phillips by the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, which first adjudicated the case.55

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA);
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (RLUIPA).
49. See Advoc. Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
50. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171
(2012); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). The Court
also had a set of funding cases creating free exercise rights to equality of treatment in
government funding programs. See Carson v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022); Espinoza v.
Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.
v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
51. See infra Part II.
52. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). Although everything seems different now, even five years
ago, everyone saw Smith’s regnancy as totally firm. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, Free
Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 125 (2016) (“While Smith was a 5–4
decision in 1990, the Supreme Court has shown itself to be fully committed to the Smith
rule.”).
53. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
54. “Phillips’ religious objection [to serving the gay couple],” the Court concluded, “was
not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.” Id. at 1731; see also
Pamela S. Karlan, Just Desserts?: Public Accommodations, Religious Accommodations,
Racial Equality, and Gay Rights, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 147 (arguing that, “in the end, the
case fizzled out,” as the Court’s decision “rested entirely on the proposition that Colorado’s
administrative proceedings had been tainted by antireligious bias [and] left articulation of any
general rule to ‘further elaboration’”).
55. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The official expressions of hostility
to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments . . . were inconsistent with what the Free
Exercise Clause requires.”). For different takes on how bad these comments were, compare
Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133,
143 (2018) (finding them less troubling), with Christopher C. Lund, Discrimination, Trump
v. Hawaii, and Masterpiece Cakeshop, 56 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author)
(finding them more troubling).
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But the Court simultaneously floated a wider theory of discrimination—a
theory taking Smith and Lukumi in a new direction. The Court turned its
focus to a set of other cases decided earlier by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.56 In those other cases, a conservative Christian named William
Jack had unsuccessfully sued a set of bakeries for refusing to make cakes
with religious messages about the sinfulness of homosexuality written out on
top.57 The Supreme Court found inconsistencies in how the commission
vindicated the gay couple’s claim of discrimination against Jack Phillips in
Masterpiece Cakeshop but rejected William Jack’s claims of
discrimination.58 The Court took those inconsistencies as evidence of
discrimination against Jack Phillips.59 And, in a separate concurrence,
Justices Gorsuch and Alito took it further, arguing that it was not just
evidence of discrimination. It was discrimination itself, discrimination
simpliciter, they claimed, for Colorado to find Jack Phillips liable for
discrimination while dismissing William Jack’s analogous claims.60
This theory—adopted by the Court and vigorously defended by two
justices—reveals the complexities of the new Free Exercise Clause. The
Court faulted the commission for treating the legal claims against Jack
Phillips better than those brought by William Jack. But the truth is that there
was no necessary inconsistency in how the commission acted.
Discrimination law could plausibly draw the line between good legal claims
and bad legal claims in any number of places—including the line between
cakes with visibly written messages (the cakes requested by William Jack)
and those without them (the cakes requested by the gay couple in
Masterpiece Cakeshop). After all, visibly written messages require someone
to write them out, thus requiring a special imposition on objecting bakers.
56. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The Commission’s disparate
consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same
[kind of discriminatory animus].”). For a strong formulation of this point, see Douglas
Laycock, The Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2019 B.Y.U. L. REV. 167,
183–84, 187–88; Berg, supra note 10, at 144–45, 152–54.
57. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728 (first citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd.,
Charge No. P20140071X, slip op. at 4 (Colo. C.R. Div. Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/GateauxDecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN4U-NE6V]; then
Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, slip op. at 4 (Colo. C.R. Div. Mar.
24, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/LeBakerySensualDecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5DUZ-27ZW]; and then Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, slip op. at 4 (Colo.
C.R. Div. Mar. 24, 2015), http://mediaassets.thedenverchannel.com/document/2015/04/23/
Jack_Williams_V_Azucar_Bakery_17228465_ver1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U]).
58. To give one example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the commission saw the cake’s
message as the couple’s rather than the baker’s. Yet in the Jack cases, the commission viewed
the cake’s message as the baker’s rather than the couple’s. See id. at 1730 (“[T]he Commission
ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message the requested wedding cake would
carry would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address
this point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting anti–gay marriage
symbolism.”); see also Laycock, supra note 56, at 183–84 (pointing to other inconsistencies).
59. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
60. See id. at 1734 (noting that some justices “have written separately to suggest that the
Commission acted neutrally toward [Jack Phillips] when it treated him differently from the
other bakers—or that it could have easily done so consistent with the First Amendment,” but
then concluding, “I do not see how we might rescue the Commission from its error”).
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Now maybe such a line would be dumb—unresponsive to the real concerns
at stake. But that would not make it incoherent, and even that would not
make it religiously discriminatory. Justice Gorsuch seems confident that the
commission was attracted to this line because he believes it harbored
religious prejudice against Jack Phillips.61 And he could well be right about
that, given the other facts in the case. But that turns Masterpiece Cakeshop
back into a case about bad motives and tacitly abandons the position that the
line drawn by Colorado was inherently discriminatory.62
But there is an even deeper problem with the Court’s theory of
discrimination in Masterpiece Cakeshop. The Court starts from the implicit
premise that William Jack’s claims and the gay couple’s claims in
Masterpiece Cakeshop have to be treated the same way—that Colorado has
a constitutional obligation to interpret its ban on religious discrimination and
its ban on sexual-orientation discrimination coextensively. In fact, all nine
justices on the Court assume this, even the dissenters. The Court seems to
think discrimination against religious discrimination claims is a kind of
religious discrimination. But this is not true. Discrimination against
religious-discrimination claims is not a form or species of religious
discrimination. This is just a conceptual mistake.
To see the mistake most clearly, suppose Colorado had a law forbidding
sexual-orientation discrimination in public accommodations, but no law
forbidding religious discrimination in public accommodations. Under the
Court’s theory in Masterpiece Cakeshop, that is clearly unconstitutional; it
is, in fact, an a fortiori case. After all, in that world, the gay couple in
Masterpiece Cakeshop would still have a winning claim, and William Jack
now would not even have a chance. Yet such a conclusion would be
breathtaking—it would imply that every state must have statutory protections
(coextensively interpreted) for every kind of constitutionally protected
behavior or characteristic. That would have broad implications.63 To take
61. See, e.g., id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that Colorado drew the line it
did “[o]nly by adjusting the dials just right” so as to “engineer the Commission’s outcome,”
and concluding that “[s]uch results-driven reasoning is improper”).
62. In a different way, one sees that same tacit abandonment in Justice Gorsuch’s repeated
insistence that Phillips had religious reasons for seeing his cake as carrying his own message.
See id. (“To some, all wedding cakes may appear indistinguishable. But to Mr. Phillips that
is not the case—his faith teaches him otherwise.”); id. at 1739–40 (“It is no more appropriate
for the United States Supreme Court to tell Mr. Phillips that a wedding cake is just like any
other—without regard to the religious significance his faith may attach to it—than it would be
for the Court to suggest that for all persons sacramental bread is just bread or a kippah is just
a cap.”). The easy response to Justice Gorsuch’s argument is that Phillips’s religious reasons
do nothing to undermine the legitimacy of Colorado’s reasons for drawing the line where it
did. Justice Gorsuch’s argument becomes an argument for religious exemptions and against
Smith, rather than an argument about religious discrimination simpliciter.
63. Just to give one example, consider how some states forbid discrimination in public
accommodations on the basis of religion but not sexual orientation. See Paul Vincent
Courtney, Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Public Accommodations:
A Common Law Approach, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1500–01 (2015) (“Although forty-five
states have enacted public accommodations statutes, the statutes of only twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.”). If the Court
is right that it amounts to religious discrimination to protect gays and lesbians, but not religious
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just one of them, consider 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which forbids racial
discrimination (but not religious discrimination) in contracting.64 An
interracial couple denied a cake by someone like Jack Phillips could
successfully sue him for racial discrimination under § 1981, but someone like
William Jack would not be able to use § 1981 to sue bakeries for religious
discrimination when those bakeries refuse to put derogatory messages about
interracial couples on wedding cakes. The Court’s logic implies there is
something unconstitutional about § 1981. But that cannot be right.65
All this does not just go to the logic of one narrow Supreme Court case.
For although no one on the Court ever puts it in these terms, Masterpiece
Cakeshop highlights a conceptual problem with the Smith-Lukumi notion of
general applicability.66
The Court’s true objection to Colorado’s
discrimination law, in essence, is that it is not generally applicable—or at
least not generally applicable enough. Colorado made an exception to its
discrimination laws when it dismissed William Jack’s claims. Now having
made that exception, the logic goes, general applicability requires that the
claims against Jack Phillips also be dismissed—as in Fraternal Order or
Lukumi, the existing secular exception generates a claim for a religious
exemption.
But this framing enables us to see just how manipulable the idea of general
applicability has become. General applicability has courts give religious
exemptions only when governments have already made other “exceptions”
to the “rule” in question. But what counts as the “rule,” and what counts as
the “exception,” tacitly depend on the level of generality in how things are
framed. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, if one frames the rule at a low level of
generality (if the rule is the “specific Colorado law forbidding religious
people, from discrimination, see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730, then it must also
amount to sexual-orientation discrimination to protect religious people but not gays and
lesbians. This means that all of the states above are acting unconstitutionally. Of course, this
assumes that the Constitution protects gays and lesbians from discrimination by the state. But
that assumption seems almost unassailable now. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644
(2015).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (providing that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens”); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976) (“It
is now well established that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits racial discrimination
in the making and enforcement of private contracts.” (citation omitted)).
65. Now, to be clear, if it was shown that Colorado refused to interpret its ban on religious
discrimination as powerfully as its ban on sexual-orientation discrimination because it disliked
religious people (or disliked conservative Christians) bringing discrimination suits, that would
be a different story. But again, that would turn Masterpiece Cakeshop into a case about bad
motives and would tacitly abandon the idea that Colorado’s line was inherently discriminatory.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining a similar point).
66. Professor Laycock defends Justice Gorsuch’s view without talking about general
applicability. But one nevertheless sees traces of the concept throughout his piece, particularly
in this statement: “The state’s conclusion that the law did not apply to the William Jack bakers
undermined its interest in ending discrimination to the same extent as a conclusion that
Masterpiece Cakeshop was entitled to exemption from the law on grounds of religious
liberty.” Laycock, supra note 56, at 189 (emphasis added).
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discrimination”), then Colorado has made no exceptions to it, and so Jack
Phillip’s claim for a religious exemption should lose. But if one frames the
rule at a higher level of generality (if the rule is “all of Colorado’s laws
forbidding discrimination”), then Colorado made an exception in the William
Jack cases, and so Jack Phillip’s claim for a religious exemption should win.
Everything depends on the level of generality.
But this creates concerns about manipulation, and those concerns extend
far beyond Masterpiece Cakeshop. One can always get the religious claim
to win if one raises the level of generality sufficiently. (Considered as a
whole, American law is not generally applicable.) And one can always get
the religious claim to lose by lowering the level of generality. (Every law
applies to all the things to which it applies.) Moreover, because the
level-of-generality question is always antecedent and not really capable of
objective resolution, general applicability becomes a protean concept—
perpetually contestable and quite manipulable.
We will turn back to this idea more formally later,67 but we can see now
how Masterpiece Cakeshop illustrates how modern free exercise
jurisprudence involves a certain degree of gamesmanship. And this means
that the success of free exercise claims will depend heavily on judicial
temperament—judges sympathetic to certain claims can manipulate the level
of generality one way, while judges unsympathetic to those claims can
manipulate it the other way. This is surely better than a world without
religious exemptions. But it is not the best.
2. Tandon: “Most Favored Nation” Status
The Supreme Court’s next encounters with the Free Exercise Clause came
in a flurry of cases arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic.68 Wanting to
minimize COVID’s spread, state and local governments implemented
quarantine orders typically banning gatherings (including religious ones) of
more than ten people, with limited exceptions.
Religious organizations challenged those orders, and the Supreme Court
initially turned those challenges away.69 In South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom,70 for example, the Supreme Court upheld California’s
decision to continue limiting attendance at churches, even though California
had completely reopened manufacturing facilities, warehouses, and offices—

67. See infra Part II.A.
68. For a thorough factual overview of these cases, see Josh Blackman, The “Essential”
Free Exercise Clause, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637 (2021).
69. These cases, it should be noted, were “shadow docket” cases that involved requests
for emergency relief and were heard on an expedited basis. See William Baude, Foreword:
The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2015). For criticism of the
Roberts Court’s use of the shadow docket, see Steve Vladeck, Shadow Dockets Are Normal,
the Way SCOTUS Is Using Them Is the Problem, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 6:09 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/scotus-shadow-docket-use-problem.html
[https://perma.cc/K6ZY-FKHM].
70. 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
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and, in some places, schools and in-restaurant dining.71 Religious
organizations argued those “secular exceptions” rendered California’s rules
not generally applicable: these nonreligious gatherings posed the same risk
of COVID transmission as religious services, they argued, so it was
discriminatory for California to allow them without allowing religious
services. Yet the Court rejected this claim.72
But things changed overnight when Justice Barrett replaced Justice
Ginsburg on the Supreme Court. In a flash, the 5–4 decisions against
churches became 5–4 decisions in their favor, and the same arguments that
failed before now succeeded. In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo,73 the
Court invalidated New York’s rules limiting religious gatherings to ten
people because of the exceptions made for various businesses deemed
essential and allowed to open.74
Later on, in Tandon v. Newsom,75 the rules both crystallized and
formalized. At issue there was California’s rule limiting religious gatherings
in homes to three families. This rule was nondiscriminatory in the most
obvious sense. It applied to both religious gatherings and nonreligious
ones—you simply could not have three non-related families gathering in the
same home. But the Supreme Court still invalidated it because of how
California treated businesses:
California treats some comparable secular activities more favorably than
at-home religious exercise, permitting hair salons, retail stores, personal
care services, movie theaters, private suites at sporting events and concerts,
and indoor restaurants to bring together more than three households at a
time [and these activities have not been shown] to pose a lesser risk of
transmission than applicants’ proposed religious exercise. 76

Tandon can be criticized from several directions. The strongest criticism
is that the Court was simply wrong on the facts. There was, in truth, good
reason to think that the businesses in question posed less transmission risk
than gatherings of three families in the same house.77
71. See id. at 1613, see also Michael Helfand, Religious Liberty and Religious
Discrimination: Where Is the Supreme Court Headed?, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 98,
101–03 (providing an overview of S. Bay and the other cases).
72. As is typical for cases in this posture, the Court offered no explanation for this, simply
denying injunctive relief without an opinion. In a concurrence explaining his own views,
Chief Justice Roberts stressed that several of the permitted secular gatherings still had
attendance limits, that courts should defer to politically accountable officials during a
pandemic, and that the legal standard for obtaining an injunction pending appeal was high
indeed. See S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
73. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
74. The Court held that New York’s rule was not generally applicable after focusing on
the long list of businesses that New York had deemed essential. See id. at 66 (“[T]he list of
‘essential’ businesses includes things such as acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages,
as well as many whose services are not limited to those that can be regarded as essential, such
as all plants manufacturing chemicals and microelectronics and all transportation facilities.”).
75. 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 1297.
77. In dissent, Justice Kagan espoused this view, stressing that these were simply the facts
the district court found: “No doubt this evidence is inconvenient for the per curiam’s preferred
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Tandon’s doctrinal legacy lies in how it makes explicit something that had
been only implicit back in Roman Catholic Diocese. In Tandon, the Court
formally adopts the “most favored nation” approach to the concept of general
applicability—an approach we saw back in the Third Circuit’s decision in
Fraternal Order.78 “[G]overnment regulations are not neutral and generally
applicable,” Tandon says, “whenever they treat any comparable secular
activity more favorably than religious exercise.”79 Even a single secular
exception requires a religious exemption under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court said, as long as that secular exception undermines the rule to the same
extent as a religious exemption.80
3. Fulton: Hypothetical Exemptions
We now come to the final case in the Supreme Court’s recent triumvirate:
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.81 Fulton repeats many of the same issues,
themes, and political dynamics as Masterpiece Cakeshop.82 Fulton saw three
groups square off against each other: Catholic Social Services (CSS), gay
couples seeking to adopt, and the city of Philadelphia. After a newspaper
story about how CSS would not certify gay couples as prospective foster
parents, Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services ended up canceling
CSS’s contract with the city.83 Ultimately, Fulton ends like Masterpiece
Cakeshop: the Court rules for the religious claimants, but on a relatively
narrow ground.
Like Tandon, Fulton is a case about general applicability. CSS’s contract
with Philadelphia had a provision forbidding CSS from rejecting any
adoptive family. But at the same time, the contract gave the commissioner
of Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services the power to make
exceptions to that provision—exceptions that would allow partner agencies
to reject adoptive families.84 Now most would agree that if the commissioner

result. But the Court has no warrant to ignore the record in a case that (on its own view) turns
on risk assessments.” Id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
78. See Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
366–67 (3d Cir. 1999).
79. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (adding, moreover, that “[i]t is no answer that a State treats
some comparable secular businesses or other activities as poorly as or even less favorably than
the religious exercise at issue”).
80. As Professors Laycock and Berg put it, Tandon now requires religious exemptions
“whenever regulations exempt or permit even one comparable secular activity.” Douglas
Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Free Exercise Under Smith and After Smith,
2020–2021 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 33, 35.
81. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). For an in-depth look at Fulton, see Laycock & Berg, supra
note 80, at 34–38.
82. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 160 (2014)
(discussing how “much of the reason for the shift in views on accommodation involves another
contested field in the American culture wars: the status of gay rights and same-sex marriage”).
83. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1875–76.
84. Section 3.21 of the contract had the following provision: “Provider shall not reject a
child or family including, but not limited to . . . prospective foster or adoptive parents, for
Services based upon . . . their . . . sexual orientation . . . unless an exception is granted by the
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had actually exempted someone else from that provision, then CSS would
have had a strong claim to a religious exemption. But that did not happen.
As it turned out, the commissioner had never actually made an exception for
anyone else. Yet the Supreme Court in Fulton ruled for CSS anyway, holding
that the mere ability of the commissioner to make exceptions entitled CSS to
an exemption, regardless of whether the commissioner had ever used that
power.85
Although Fulton raises some issues we will shortly cover, the decision
certainly makes some sense. Several cases, for example, establish a parallel
principle with regard to free speech—the government cannot have unbridled
discretion to choose among speakers because it might exercise that discretion
in discriminatory ways.86 Fulton, in a way, adopts this same principle,
translated into the context of free exercise.87
Like Masterpiece Cakeshop and Tandon, Fulton neither overrules Smith
nor changes its most basic features. Instead, Fulton conceives of itself as a
discrimination case, implicitly presuming that if Philadelphia’s rule were
truly generally applicable—that is, if the rules applied to everyone and there
was no possibility of exemptions—then CSS would really have to serve gay
couples.
Of course, if push came to shove, the Court would probably not let that
happen. But if Philadelphia’s rules were truly neutral and generally
applicable, protecting CSS would likely require the Court to overrule Smith.
Six justices raised that possibility in two different concurrences.88 But while
Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole discretion.” Id. at 1878
(emphasis added) (quoting the contract).
85. Fulton has other parts as well. Apart from the contract between CSS and Philadelphia,
there was Philadelphia’s antidiscrimination law. The Court dealt with that by concluding that
CSS was not a place of public accommodation for purposes of city law, even though no state
court had ever held such a thing. See id. at 1881. In reality, the Court seemed to be applying
a doctrine of constitutional avoidance. But the Court was understandably hesitant to say that
explicitly, because doing so (1) backhandedly implies Smith is defective and (2) ignores the
fact that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has not applied to matters of state and local
law. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1904 (2011) (“[F]ederal courts . . . often refuse, for
example, to apply widely accepted statutory interpretation doctrines—most conspicuously, the
canon of constitutional avoidance—to state-law questions . . . .”).
86. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g, 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (invalidating a city
ordinance that gave the mayor discretion over which newspapers would be sold in public news
racks, based on whatever he thought would be “necessary and reasonable”); see also Forsyth
Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (striking down a county ordinance for
giving discretion to an administrator in setting fees for parade permits).
87. As Professor Tebbe puts it:
It is true that there are freedom of speech precedents in which the Court has
invalidated licensing regimes that give too much discretion to local officials. On an
analogy to them, the mere availability of an exemption would be enough to arouse
a suspicion of impermissible burdening. That seems to have been the justification
in Fulton, and it makes some sense on its face.
Nelson Tebbe, The Principle and Politics of Liberty of Conscience, 135 HARV. L. REV. 267,
302 (2021).
88. In one concurrence, three justices (Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch) argued
straightforwardly that Smith should be overruled. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J.,

2022]

SECOND-BEST FREE EXERCISE

859

Fulton may be a harbinger of Smith’s eventual overruling, right now it stands
as just another case adopting the most protective version of Smith on the
table.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE FREE EXERCISE REVOLUTION
The Court that decided Smith would undoubtedly be amazed at how the
decision has played out. With ingenuity and determination, the Court has
somehow built a robust regime of constitutionally required religious
exemptions on the back of a case whose core idea was that the U.S.
Constitution does not require religious exemptions.89
Much of this is a good thing. Religious freedom stands on much firmer
footing than it did before; religious people and institutions can better live
their lives in a manner consistent with their faiths. But a closer look reveals
some subtle concerns about the Court’s new approach not visible at first
glance.
In this section, we focus on five worries about the present state of free
exercise: (1) the concern of manipulation, (2) the risk of going too far, (3) the
return of balancing, (4) the problem of constitutional luck, and (5) the plight
of religious minorities.
A. The Concern of Manipulation
The first concern worth noting is the risk of manipulation. We hinted at
this a bit earlier in our discussion of Masterpiece Cakeshop,90 but it is worth
repeating. Ever since Lukumi, judges have been in charge of deciding when
a secular exception to a rule is so significant that the Free Exercise Clause
entitles a religious claimant to a religious exemption.91 Courts answer this
by asking whether a religious exemption would threaten the government’s
stated interest as much as an existing secular exception already does.92 But
this gives judges a great deal of discretion—discretion in (1) figuring out
what the government’s real interests are in a policy, (2) deciding whether
something should be recognized as a secular exception, (3) determining the
degree of harm to the government’s interests created by the existing secular
exemptions, and (4) comparing that harm to the harm posed by the proposed
religious exemption.
Maybe most crucially, judges have discretion over the level of generality
in how things are framed. By widening their field of vision, certain things
will appear as exceptions to the rule that would not appear within a narrower
frame. Masterpiece Cakeshop is the example we used before.93 There, the
concurring). In another concurrence, three other justices (Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Breyer)
raised questions about Smith but stopped short of saying it should be overruled. See id. at 1882
(Barrett, J., concurring).
89. See supra Part I.
90. See supra Part I.B.1.
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. See supra Part I.A.
93. See supra Part I.B.1.
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Court objected to Colorado’s application of antidiscrimination law on the
ground that it had not been applied in a generally applicable manner. Having
made an exception to its discrimination laws when it dismissed William
Jack’s assorted claims, general applicability demanded that the claims
against Jack Phillips also be dismissed.
This illustrated the manipulability of general applicability as a concept.
Jack Phillips loses if one takes a narrow field of vision (taking the law as the
“specific Colorado law forbidding religious discrimination”). Jack Phillips
wins if one takes a broader field of vision (taking the law as “all of Colorado’s
laws forbidding discrimination”). Religious claimants argue for raising the
level of generality, governments argue for lowering it, and there is no
objective way to decide who is right.
Maybe the best way of showing this is through the Court’s recent decisions
under RFRA and RLUIPA. All of them could now be rewritten as Free
Exercise cases. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal94 held that a Brazilian group could use hoasca in its religious
rituals.95 Gonzales was a RFRA case, but the Court could now give the
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause, the idea being that the exception
for religious use of peyote in the drug laws destroys the general applicability
of Schedule I.96 Also a RFRA case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.97
partially exempted a religiously run business from the Affordable Care
Act’s98 contraceptive mandate.99 But now, the Court could take the
exceptions for small businesses and grandfathered plans as eliminating the
general applicability of the act. Holt v. Hobbs,100 an RLUIPA case, could be
decided on the basis of the secular exception to the rule that allowed
quarter-inch beards needed for medical reasons.101 It may be true that not
every case could be decided this way—Texas’s rule in Ramirez v. Collier102
really does seem generally applicable from all directions.103 But all this
illustrates the malleability and manipulability of the Free Exercise Clause at
present.
B. The Risk of Going Too Far
This all leads to the next point—the risk that the Court might go too far. It
is striking how so many of the Supreme Court’s RFRA and RLUIPA
94. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
95. Id.
96. Schedule I drugs are defined by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration as “drugs
with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.” Drug Scheduling,
U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-information/drug-scheduling
[https://perma.cc/7F99-HZ9D] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
97. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
98. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
99. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682.
100. 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
101. Id.
102. 142 S. Ct. 53 (2021).
103. Id.
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decisions could be rewritten as free exercise cases. The Court’s
reconfiguring of Smith has not made RFRA and RLUIPA redundant, but the
gap between them has narrowed more than anyone would have believed
possible. And the Court’s current take on Smith certainly seems more
powerful than the old Sherbert-Yoder compelling-interest test.104
Take Quaring v. Peterson,105 an old case in which a Pentecostal woman
sought a driver’s license but was turned away when she objected to being
photographed for it on religious grounds.106 Her claim failed in the Supreme
Court because she could not get five votes from the Court in 1984 under
Sherbert-Yoder, but she now would probably get nine votes under Smith. It
certainly should be an easy case. The requested accommodation did not
burden anyone else, it did not cost the state much, and few religious people
wanted anything similar.107 Plus, there were a ton of secular exceptions in
the rule that a Court under Smith could use to make it happen doctrinally.108
If this is so, the Court has pulled off the doctrinal heist of the century.
Smith dismissed Sherbert-Yoder as being too protective of free exercise. But,
as now applied, Smith is probably more protective of free exercise than
Sherbert-Yoder. This tells a fascinating story about the irrelevance of formal
doctrine. A similar story could be told with the Establishment Clause, where
the Court moved from forbidding the funding of religious institutions to
allowing it (and now to requiring it), all somehow under the same three-part
test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.109 Of course, this makes it seem a little weird
that the Court is presently considering whether to overrule Smith and go back
to the compelling-interest test of Sherbert-Yoder. But there is no real
weirdness, as everyone knows a new compelling-interest test for free
exercise would resemble Sherbert-Yoder only linguistically; we have little
idea what it would mean in practice.
All this puts us in uncharted territory, and there is some risk that the Court
will go too far with the Free Exercise Clause. Of course, what counts as
“going too far” will be different for different people; some would say the
Court has already gone too far. Yet the Court’s free exercise decisions so far
have been relatively narrow and supported by supermajorities of the Court.
Masterpiece Cakeshop was 7–2; Fulton was 9–0.110 It is true that Tandon
was 5–4, but the Court there split not over the law but over the facts—the
dissenters did not object to Tandon’s legal conception of general
applicability, but on the factual issue of relative transmission risk. It is not

104. See supra note 24.
105. 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Jensen v.
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 1123.
108. See id. at 1126–27.
109. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see id. at 612. Professor Laycock gets the credit for this insight,
pointing it out to me in conversation.
110. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018);
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1868 (2021).
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clear when the Free Exercise Clause will lose that fifth vote, but it will keep
growing until it does.
So if the Court has not yet gone too far, it surely might. Consider a recent
case that reached the Court, Dr. A. v. Hochul.111 It involved New York’s
requirement that health-care workers be vaccinated against COVID. Lower
courts refused to enjoin the requirement, and the Supreme Court did not
interfere. But in a dissent for himself and Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch
argued that New York’s requirement likely violated the Free Exercise
Clause.112
The way Justice Gorsuch saw it, New York’s requirement failed to be
generally applicable because New York had exempted those with medical
needs from the requirement.113 The logic paralleled Lukumi’s: New York
“prohibits exemptions for religious reasons while permitting exemptions for
medical reasons,” and the state’s goals are undermined “equally whether the
worker happens to remain unvaccinated for religious reasons or medical
ones.”114 Now, Justice Gorsuch conceded, maybe there might be more
religious objectors than those with medical needs.115 But the policy still fails
the requirement of general applicability—the numbers would only affect the
application of strict scrutiny, not whether it is triggered. And, most
strikingly, Justice Gorsuch added that exemptions would need to be rationed
out equally between the religious objectors and those with medical needs.116
Justice Gorsuch clearly thinks that New York lacks a strong interest in
forcing vaccination on religious objectors, and maybe he is right.117 But
there is something a little unsettling about this as a conception of general
applicability. And what’s a little unsettling is this—Justice Gorsuch’s
analysis is totally blind to the reasons why New York has exempted those

111. 142 S. Ct. 552 (2021).
112. See id. at 555 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
113. Justice Gorsuch also argued that the policy failed Smith’s neutrality prong, pointing
to untoward comments made by Governor Kathy Hochul and the fact that she initially
promised a religious exemption and then apparently changed her mind. See id. at 553–54. On
this point, Justice Gorsuch was on perfectly solid ground; the governor should indeed have
stayed well out of theological issues instead of saying things like, “I know you’re vaccinated,
you’re the smart ones, but you know there’s people out there who aren’t listening to God and
what God wants.” Id. at 554 (quoting Governor Hochul). For my take on similar comments
in other recent cases, see Lund, supra note 55.
114. See Dr. A., 142 S. Ct. at 556 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
115. There certainly were more religious objectors than those with medical needs—
evidence submitted by New York put the ratio somewhere around twenty-to-one. See We the
Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 286 (2d Cir.), opinion clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2d
Cir. 2021).
116. See Dr. A., 142 S. Ct. at 556–57 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state “might
prevail” if it could “contend the most narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest is to
restrict vaccine exemptions to a particular number divided in a nondiscriminatory manner
between medical and religious objectors”).
117. See id. at 557 (noting that “the evidence before us shows that employee vaccination
rates in the State’s healthcare facilities already stand at between roughly 90% and 96%,” and
that “New York has presented nothing to suggest that accommodating the religious objectors
before us would make a meaningful difference to the protection of public health”).
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with medical needs.118 Those reasons are important and contingent; they
depend on facts about the world unrelated to religious exercise. This makes
ignoring them dangerous. Put it like this: what if we could predict with
absolute certainty that an identifiable group of people would die (say,
because of a fatal allergy) if they had to get the COVID vaccine? At that
point, Justice Gorsuch would probably back away from the logic of his
dissent. He would not require religious objectors to be treated the same as
those with medical needs; he would not ration exemptions between the two
groups in proportion to their numbers. Instead, he would rightly say that we
simply have stronger reasons for exempting those with medical needs than
we have for exempting religious objectors. But that means the logic of his
dissent was wrong all along—or, at least, it was contingent on the truth of
certain things formally irrelevant to his analysis.
This makes clear two things at once. First, it highlights the risk of the new
Free Exercise Clause and how the Court might take religious liberty too far.
But second—and this will be the very next section of this Article—it
illustrates how balancing has now reentered free exercise analysis through
the backdoor. Notice how Dr. A. illustrates a striking trade-off that the Court
must face—you can have a powerful but unsustainable version of Smith
without balancing or you can have a more sensible version of Smith with a
lot of balancing. Choose your poison, but there’s poison either way. If this
point is not clear now, however, it will be after the next section.
C. The Return of Balancing
Smith was about many things. But if we are going to oversimplify and say
Smith was just about one thing, then Smith was about balancing. Consistent
with Justice Scalia’s conception of the judicial role more generally, Smith
wanted courts out of the business of balancing governmental interests against
religious ones.119
But if Smith’s plan was to get courts out of judgment-laden roles with
regard to free exercise, then things have not gone according to plan. The first
indication of this came in Lukumi, where the Court’s carefully crafted
conception of general applicability put it on judges to decide “whether the
secular exceptions endanger the purposes of the legislation to a similar or
greater degree than a religious exemption would.”120 To be sure, this did not
return the Court to the open-ended interest balancing of Sherbert-Yoder. But
it did require judges to make value-laden discretionary decisions. If you
wanted, you could think of this as the compelling-interest test, but with tight
evidentiary limits. Rather than asking whether the government’s interest was
118. For someone to obtain a medical exemption, New York requires that they get a
certification from their physician that the vaccine would be detrimental to their health due to
a preexisting health condition. For the full text of New York’s medical exception, see We the
Patriots USA, Inc., 17 F.4th at 275 n.2.
119. Dramatically, or maybe melodramatically, Smith called it “horrible to contemplate
that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the
significance of religious practice.” Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
120. Lund, supra note 20, at 640–41.
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compelling in some abstract way, courts would instead ask whether the
government had already undermined its claim of a compelling interest by
allowing analogous nonreligious behavior. If you, the government, can’t
even treat your own interests as compelling, the logic goes, then why should
we?
But in part because it was so easy, Lukumi did not talk much about the
discretion it was giving back to judges—for there is a lot of leeway in
deciding (1) the government’s real interest in a policy, (2) the exceptions the
government had previously made to that policy, (3) the harm of those existing
exceptions to that interest, and (4) the relative harm of a religious exception
to that interest. And, as discussed earlier, all of these are subject to
manipulation, particularly through the level of generality at which they are
framed.121
Even so, you might think, at least Smith got one big thing right. At least
all the judicial assessment now happens only on one side of the equation—
even if judges now must make judgments bearing on the weight of the
governmental interest, at least Smith has gotten them out of the business of
judging the religious interest in question.
But has it? This is the question: has Smith, in fact, gotten courts out of the
business of assessing religious interests? Tandon desperately wants the
answer to be yes; Tandon, in fact, firmly instructs courts not to consider the
weight of the religious interest. This is what Tandon means when it says that
“[c]omparability is concerned with the risks various activities pose, not the
reasons why people gather.”122 Remember Tandon was a case about
quarantine orders. In deciding whether a church should get to open because
a nail salon can, Tandon says the question is simply whether an open church
threatens the government’s interest (i.e., transmission risk) as much as an
open nail salon.123 Courts should address that question, Tandon directs,
without passing on whether the value of an open church is more than the
value of an open hair salon. Courts look to the relative harms of secular and
religious exemptions to the government’s interests; they do not look to the
relative benefits of secular and religious exemptions. This is how Tandon
tries to keep courts out of the free-for-all that might result if every free
exercise claim required judges to directly weigh the importance of the
religious exercise in question.
Here, however, is where I must make a little confession. For years,
I thought this was the right approach to free exercise. For years, I thought
free exercise could be handled the way that Tandon imagines. But I no longer
see things that way. I was wrong then, and Tandon is wrong now. Simply
put, it is neither sensible nor really possible for courts to truly bracket the
weight of religious interests. Repressed explicitly, it will resurface tacitly.

121. See supra notes 61–66 (discussing this point, with particular reference to Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop).
122. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
123. See id. at 1296–97.
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To see the point most clearly, start with an old case about a Native
American medicine woman criminally prosecuted for possessing owl
feathers for use in the religious rituals of her Cherokee tribe.124 Her argument
for a religious exemption under Smith hinged on the fact that the relevant
statute did not forbid possession across the board: “Possession of owl
feathers is permitted under Virginia law by taxidermists, academics,
researchers, museums, and educational institutions.”125
Appoint a student to argue the woman’s case and ask that student which
of these secular exceptions they should focus on to argue against the general
applicability of the rule. Most students will latch on quickly to what is almost
surely the right answer—the taxidermy exception.
But notice what is really happening. Taxidermy jumps out at us not
because the exception for taxidermists does more harm to the government’s
interest than the other secular exceptions do. After all, to know that, we
would have to know more about the facts—like how many owl feathers
taxidermists use, as compared to how many, say, museums use. Instead,
taxidermy jumps out at us because it just seems like an unimportant reason
to have owl feathers. If even taxidermists have the right to possess owl
feathers, the logic goes, then surely the Native American medicine woman
must be allowed to do so as well.
This logic is strikingly persuasive. But if you think about it for a bit, it
demonstrates that something fishy is happening here. What we are saying,
boiled down, is that Native American religious exercise is just more
important than taxidermy. (And it is! No offense to taxidermists!) But this
reflects how the weight of the religious interest has come in through the
backdoor, and in direct contradiction of Tandon’s instruction that courts
should focus only on the relative harm of the secular and religious
exemptions to the government’s interest. To frame it more conceptually,
consider two propositions:
Proposition A:
Proposition B:

The government cannot devalue religion.
The government cannot decide the value of religion.

Now if these propositions were considered separately, a lot of people
would say they believe in both of them—either seeing them as the same or
as mutually reinforcing. But the truth, of course, is that they are not the same;
the truth is they are contradictory and incompatible. You cannot say whether
the government has devalued religion without first deciding, either implicitly
or explicitly, what the true value of religion really is.
If the tension between these two propositions was hidden before, the
COVID-19 pandemic brought it out into the open. This is apparent in cases
like Roman Catholic Diocese and Tandon, where churches challenged

124. See Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 556 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Id. at 557.
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quarantine orders. But it was apparent even before then—in the very orders
themselves and in the problems they were trying to solve.
Forget religious organizations for a second. In deciding what things
should be open during the pandemic, governments naturally took into
account the value of those things. Essential businesses—like grocery stores,
hospitals, sometimes liquor stores—never had to close. States had different
definitions of “essential businesses,” of course, but their common task was
to identify which things were essential—which were simply too important to
close.
Moreover, these kinds of value judgments extended far beyond deciding
the narrow category of “essential businesses.” In its multistage reopening
plan, California put restaurants in stage 2 and bars in stage 3, meaning that
restaurants could reopen before bars.126 Perhaps this decision was reached
purely by considering the relative risk of COVID-19 transmission in
restaurants and bars. But I am not sure about this, especially given that social
distancing and masks were required in both places. More likely, there was
also a value judgment. California may have simply believed—and may have
had good reason for believing!—that open restaurants are simply more
important to society than open bars.
In the closure orders issued by governors and mayors, one sees these kinds
of value judgments everywhere. Grocery stores were deemed essential
because people need food and a lot of people don’t have the money (or even
reliable internet access) for grocery delivery. Childcare services were placed
in the first category of businesses to reopen because parents have a lot of
trouble working without reliable childcare for their kids. Determinations
about when different things should reopen did not merely involve questions
of fact (what’s the amount of risk?), but also questions of value (is this worth
the amount of risk?). The more something is worth, the more risk we are
willing to accept.
But this, of course, puts us in a terrible bind when it comes to figuring out
what to do with religious organizations. Take again California’s multistage
reopening plan. Essential businesses (including grocery stores, fast-food
places, and liquor stores) were in stage 1 and never had to close.127 Other
organizations were classified as stage 2 (which really consisted of two
separate stages, 2a and 2b), stage 3, and stage 4. Where do religious
organizations most naturally fit? Should religious organizations be treated
like concerts (stage 4), movie theaters (stage 3), restaurants (stage 2), or
grocery stores (stage 1)?
We must listen to the scientists, who will tell us about the comparative
transmission risk of all those things. (This is what Tandon tells us should be

126. These facts come from South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d
938, 940 (9th Cir. 2020) (Collins, J., dissenting); see also S. Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (denying application for injunctive relief).
127. For the facts that follow, see S. Bay, 959 F.3d at 940.
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our exclusive focus.)128 But that is not enough. Cost-benefit analysis
depends on us evaluating both the costs and the benefits. This means
someone also needs to tell us about the comparative value of those things.
How important is a worship service, as compared to a concert, a movie, a
meal out, or a trip to the grocery store?
But this is a real pickle. It reflects the tension between wanting a robust
devaluing principle (Proposition A) and wanting government to stay out of
the business of deciding religion’s value (Proposition B). And note this point
is institution independent—this tension exists regardless of whether the
decision-maker happens to be a governor, a legislature, or a court. In
ordinary life, we believe pretty strongly in Proposition B. The government
does not decide religion’s value because people decide the value of religion
for themselves. People might think religion good or bad; they might think it
valuable, invaluable, or worthless. But each of us decides the issue for
ourselves—we decide, with those we love and trust, whether to believe, what
to believe, and how to practice. But the pandemic changed all this because
what had previously been utterly ordinary activities started creating new
kinds of spillover costs on everyone else. Your decision to go to a bar, a
restaurant, or a church service started affecting my life differently than it did
before. And these brand-new, third-party harms forced governments into the
role of making binding and collective decisions about the worth of virtually
everything—including the worth of religion.
And, just to be clear, I doubt there was any real way governments could
have avoided these decisions.
Any quarantine scheme classifying
organizations by type would have to deal with them. And any other kind of
quarantine scheme would run into real practical problems. For if
governments could not classify organizations by type—if they could only
make generally applicable rules like “indoor masks,” “six feet apart,”
“buildings at 50 percent capacity”—they would lose the capacity to draw
distinctions even among nonreligious organizations. California would be
unable to favor restaurants over bars. It would be unable to give any priority
to grocery stores, hospitals, or childcare services. Sensible quarantine
schemes must classify organizations by type. But classifying organizations
by type, and trying to figure out what to do with religious organizations,
returns us to the thicket. Everyone, or at least most people, would say
religious exercise should be given a high priority when it comes to being
allowed to reopen. But how high? High by what measure?
Of all the Supreme Court COVID cases that could be used to press the
point, the best is probably Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,129 which
involved Nevada’s quarantine scheme. Under Nevada’s rules, religious
organizations—churches, synagogues, mosques, and so on—could have a
maximum of fifty people. But casinos could have up to 50 percent of their
128. These are the “risks” that the Tandon Court referred to with the line, “[c]omparability
is concerned with the risks various activities pose, not the reasons why people gather.” Tandon
v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
129. 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
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maximum capacity—and, given their size, that meant effectively thousands
of people.130 Moreover, casinos are actually like religious organizations in
some ways that bear on risk transmission. Like churches, and unlike grocery
stores, people tend to stay at casinos for significant periods of time.
A number of Supreme Court justices thought this unconstitutional. They
said it devalued religious exercise. “[T]here is no world,” Justice Gorsuch
memorably wrote, “in which the Constitution permits Nevada to favor
Caesars Palace over Calvary Chapel.”131 Justice Gorsuch had a solid point:
if casinos and churches are similar in terms of risk transmission, then the
decision to let casinos open, while forcing churches to remain closed, is
indeed a value judgment that casinos are more important than churches.
But at the same time, consider this. Nevada apparently gets more than
30 percent of its revenue—almost a billion and a half dollars per year—from
casinos and their related hotels.132 Nevada needs the casinos to be open—it
needs that money to fix the roads, to keep the schools open, and to maintain
various social programs. The argument that churches should open because
casinos are open and pose the same kinds of health risks only works, as a
logical matter, if the benefits of churches and casinos are roughly equal. But
are they? Casinos are worth more than a billion dollars to Nevada. What can
we honestly say about churches in this respect? Are they worth a billion
dollars to Nevada? More? Less? How much? How could we possibly say?
In a concurring opinion in Calvary Chapel, Justice Kavanaugh admirably
addressed some of this. He talked about the general economic benefits of
casinos, as opposed to the taxes they paid to Nevada. But he then said this:
[N]o precedent suggests that a State may discriminate against religion
simply because a religious organization does not generate the economic
benefits that a restaurant, bar, casino, or gym might provide. Nevada’s
rules reflect an implicit judgment that for-profit assemblies are important
and religious gatherings are less so; that moneymaking is more important
than faith during the pandemic. But that rationale “devalues religious
reasons” for congregating “by judging them to be of lesser import than
nonreligious reasons,” in violation of the Constitution.133

These are all good points, but there are weak spots in this analysis as well.
For one thing, it is strange to rely on the absence of a precedent. More
fundamentally, the claim of discrimination here assumes its premise: Justice
130. Justice Alito’s dissent explains the core facts, which were undisputed: “A church,
synagogue, or mosque, regardless of its size, may not admit more than fifty persons, but
casinos and certain other favored facilities may admit 50 percent of their maximum
occupancy—and in the case of gigantic Las Vegas casinos, this means that thousands of
patrons are allowed.” Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
132. See How Gaming Benefits Nevada, NEV. RESORT ASS’N, https://nevadaresorts.org/
benefits/taxes.php [perma.cc/VX5E-5U4E] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
133. See Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537–38 (1993)). Or, as
Professor Berg put it, “[t]he state may value the jobs and revenue that casinos and bowling
produce; but it may not value the constitutional right of religion less.” Berg, supra note 42, at
742.
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Kavanaugh says economic benefits do not justify this discrimination between
casinos and religious organizations (and why don’t they, again?). But the
real claim is that the differences between casinos and religious organizations,
in terms of their economic benefits, mean this is not really discrimination at
all. Religion has not been devalued, because there are reasons for exempting
casinos that just don’t apply to churches.
To be clear, I am on Justice Kavanaugh’s side in all of this—I, too, would
have invalidated Nevada’s rules in Calvary Chapel. I suppose Justice
Kavanaugh’s response to this would probably be that Nevada is still treating
casinos and churches differently, and that the government could justify that
differential treatment only by showing a compelling interest. But whether it
happens at the general-applicability stage, or whether it happens at the
compelling-interest stage, courts still must somehow assign a weight to the
religious interest. The way Justice Kavanaugh would do it, the question
would be this: given that casinos are worth about a billion dollars to Nevada,
are churches worth so much less that Nevada has a compelling interest in
keeping the churches closed but the casinos open? That question cannot be
answered without assigning some weight to the religious interest. In this
way, balancing (and direct judicial assessments of the worth of religious
exercise) has indeed returned to free exercise. Such judgments are not bad;
any regime even modestly concerned with free exercise will have to make
them. But it is important to see that our system has already given up on
Smith’s core idea—the impermissibility of interest balancing.
D. The Problem of Constitutional Luck
Earlier sections have stressed the points in the analysis where Smith gives
judges a lot of discretion.134 But the opposite is also true, at least in small
part. For in one crucial respect, Smith denies judges any discretion. Smith is
still an antidiscrimination right, rather than a substantive right (like freedom
of speech). So to get a religious exemption, Smith requires religious
claimants to show they have been discriminated against in some sense—
Smith requires them to show a “secular exception” that has already
undermined the law in question as much as a religious exemption would.
Now, as we have seen, the Court has been extremely generous with various
parts of that analysis. But Smith’s very nature imposes some fundamental
limits on how generous the Court can be. The basic limit can be stated in a
sentence. Unless there is some existing secular exception to a rule, religious
claims for exemptions from the rule must fail.
This limitation destabilizes the entire regime of free exercise, rendering
it—as I have put it before—a matter of luck.135 Return to Fraternal Order—
that old Third Circuit case decided by then Judge Alito about the Muslim

134. See supra Part I.A.
135. What follows here comes originally from Lund, supra note 20.
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police officers who sought a right to wear beards as required by their faith.136
Recall that they won their case because the police department had earlier
permitted other officers to wear beards—namely, officers who had a rare skin
condition called pseudo folliculitis barbae.137
But this prompts questions: What if the officers with that skin condition
had not needed a medical exception because there were other treatments for
it? Or what if the skin condition had simply never existed? In either case,
there would be no medical exception and thus no religious exception, and so
the Muslim officers would have ended up losing.
This is a real problem with Smith and Lukumi. They can only generate
religious exemptions when the needs of religious believers just happen to
overlap with other peoples’ nonreligious needs. In practice, that means that
free exercise exemptions will end up turning on idiosyncrasies. Muslim
officers will have the legal right to follow the Qur’an only if enough other
people have uncurable skin conditions (Fraternal Order). Santería
congregations will be able to practice their religion only if other people kill
animals in secular contexts sufficiently analogous to Santería sacrifice
(Lukumi). Religious exemptions turn on more-or-less random factors—
factors not directly related either to the religious claimant’s interest in getting
an exemption or the government’s interest in denying one. This is the
problem of constitutional luck.
E. The Plight of Religious Minorities
Another worrying facet of the Smith-Lukumi framework lies in how it
treats religious minorities. The previous section of this Article raised the
problem of constitutional luck, and for reasons we will explore, we can
expect that problem to most profoundly affect religious minorities.
Moreover, certain aspects of the Court’s most recent decisions also come into
play—although those decisions have lowered barriers faced by certain kinds
of free exercise claims, they are likely to do the least for the kinds of claims
religious minorities typically bring.
1. Religious Minorities and the Triple Barrier
But before getting into all these points, we should start at the beginning.
Religious minorities seeking to exercise their religion in this country find
themselves limited in three ways, which we could call the “triple barrier.”
The first barrier arises from the Constitution itself. Forget the Religion
Clauses for the moment. For even without them, the Constitution establishes
rights that backhandedly protect majoritarian religious practices.
Undoubtedly, the best example is the Free Speech Clause.138 Now the Free
136. See Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
360 (3d Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text (discussing Fraternal
Order); see also Lund, supra note 20, at 647–52 (making some of these points).
137. See Fraternal Order, 170 F.3d at 360.
138. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (“[R]eligious worship and
discussion . . . are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment.”);
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Speech Clause is religiously neutral in the most obvious sense—it gives all
religious groups (and, in fact, nonreligious ones) the same rights.139 But the
right to evangelize—an aspect of the right of free speech140—is relied on
particularly heavily by evangelical faiths who see it as vital to share their
faith with others. And, of course, this is hardly a coincidence. If one goes
back to the Founding, one sees an overwhelmingly Protestant population that
valued free speech in significant part because they valued and sought to
protect religious evangelization.141
This illustrates something important. Perhaps the most significant
religious practice of the most significant religious groups in America are
constitutionally protected, even without the Free Exercise Clause. The same
is not true for other religious groups. There were no Jews or Muslims at the
Constitutional Convention; no one cared about protecting their primary
religious practices through other parts of the constitutional text. All this is to
say that religious minorities need specific free exercise rights in ways that
other religious groups may not.
The second barrier arises from the nature of the legislative process. This
is so obvious that it feels odd to say. But religious minorities are, in fact,
minorities. As such, they have a more difficult time obtaining religious
exemptions from the political branches. Legislators respond well to sizeable
groups of voters and campaign contributions. But that dynamic generates a
political process in which large and wealthy groups will find it easier to

Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (“Our precedent
establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully
protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.”).
139. In fact, it would violate both the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause to
prefer religious speech over nonreligious speech. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd.,
515 U.S. at 766 (“Of course, giving sectarian religious speech preferential [treatment] . . .
would violate the Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it would
involve content discrimination).”); see also Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 653 (1981) (“[N]onreligious organizations seeking support for their
activities are entitled to rights equal to those of religious groups to . . . spread their views,
whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature.”).
140. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 760 (noting that the Court “ha[s]
not excluded from free-speech protections . . . religious proselytizing or even acts of
worship”). For some careful thoughts on this, see Richard W. Garnett, Changing Minds:
Proselytism, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 453, 465–72 (2005).
141. Many religious disputes at the Founding were over religious expression. See Michael
W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment
of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2165–66 (2003) (giving examples). As Justice
Scalia memorably put it, “in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of
speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause
without religion would be Hamlet without the prince.” Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd.,
515 U.S. at 760. And indeed, one of the Court’s first free speech cases involved a Christian
minister who sought to speak on Boston Common, although his claim went well beyond the
Court’s understanding at the time. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (“For
the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of
a private house to forbid it in his house.”).
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obtain religious exemptions, and small and less wealthy ones will find it
harder.142
The third barrier arises from Smith itself. The way Smith has unfolded, it
protects religious needs only to the extent there are analogous secular needs.
In the last section, we labeled this the problem of “constitutional luck.”
But it is important to see how religious minorities are less likely to have
this kind of luck than other groups. Though this is somewhat of an
overgeneralization, religious minorities tend to have religious practices that
the dominant culture tends to see as strange and idiosyncratic (and sometimes
threatening). Indeed, these features are often the reason why we might
consider a group to be a religious minority in the first place. But to the extent
religious minorities seek to do things few other people will want to do, they
will naturally be burdened by laws that do not burden other people. To the
extent this logic holds, we would expect statutes burdening the religious
exercise of religious minorities to be disproportionately uniform (that is,
exceptionless). So not only will religious minorities have more difficulty
getting accommodations from legislatures, but they also will have more
difficulty getting them from courts because general applicability as a concept
is somewhat stacked against them.
For example, take a small religious group seeking to use an obscure drug
in their religious practices.143 These very things (the smallness of the group,
the unfamiliarity of the drug) make it less likely that anyone will want to use
this drug for nonreligious reasons. Secular exceptions to this rule are unlikely
to develop, which precludes the possibility of a religious exemption. And
speaking more generally, it seems logical to think religious minorities will
have religious needs with fewer secular parallels—it is hard to imagine
secular analogues, for example, to the religious prohibitions against
photographs, automobiles, or blood transfusions.144
Now this point should not be pushed too far. Counterexamples come
quickly to mind. Fraternal Order and Lukumi are both good examples of
obscure religious needs just happening to have nonreligious analogues. But
because of the close relationship between religion and culture, one can
142. Everyone now sees Lukumi as an easy case. But Professor Laycock reminds us that
this was not the case at the time: “Stephen Solarz, the lead sponsor of RFRA in the House,
wanted to file a congressional amicus brief in Lukumi, but he could not get a single
Representative or Senator to even consider signing such a brief. The Santeria religion was too
unpopular to touch.” Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 743, 776 (1998); cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) (“Free
exercise thus can be guaranteed only when legislators . . . are required to accord to their own
religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations.”).
143. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423
(2006) (involving a small Brazilian group, the Uniao do Vegetal, who sought to use a relatively
unknown drug, hoasca, in their religious rituals).
144. See Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and
Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 359 (2010) (“Small religious minorities often
want idiosyncratic things—they demand rights that no one else wants.”); James M. Oleske,
Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare
Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 329 (2013) (“The practices of small religious minorities often are
not shared by others.”).
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probably expect viable secular analogues to arise most often for culturally
dominant religious practices. This is part of why Smith’s effects will likely
be hardest on religious minorities.
2. Religious Minorities and the Supreme Court’s Recent Cases
Whenever the law creates discretion in implementation, we naturally
worry about how that discretion will be exercised, and one persistent fear is
that minority groups will bear the brunt of that discretion. As we have seen,
so many of free exercise’s core concepts—what counts as the “rule,” what
counts as its “purpose,” what counts as a “secular exception”—are somewhat
manipulable. A judge sympathetic to a claimant’s religious practices will
have some (though not unlimited) freedom to manipulate those concepts to
give an exemption, while an unsympathetic judge will have freedom to deny
one. Of course, this is true for a lot of the ways free exercise doctrines could
be shaped—it was true under Sherbert-Yoder as much as it is today under
Smith.
But certain aspects of the Court’s recent free exercise jurisprudence
backhandedly compound these fears. Consider some common features of the
Supreme Court’s three most recent decisions: Tandon, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, and Fulton. All of them generously interpret the Free Exercise
Clause to maximize religious exemptions within Smith’s constraints. But all
three are also culture-war cases, with two sides that are highly motivated,
well represented, and well funded. All three also involve relatively formal
policies established by written documents, with public and documented
enforcement histories. In important ways, these features have come to shape
the protections of the Free Exercise Clause and its boundaries.
Start with Fulton, where the Supreme Court exempted Catholic Social
Services from Philadelphia’s contractual requirement that CSS serve all
couples because that requirement gave Philadelphia officials the ability to
make exemptions.145 Fulton is a straightforward case and a unanimous one
too. But what exactly does Fulton mean? Fulton cannot mean that religious
claimants get exemptions anytime any government official has the power to
make an exemption for them. That may be the way Fulton most naturally
reads, but it would mean every religious exemption claim now gets
heightened scrutiny. After all, some government official always has the
power to look the other way and not enforce the rules.
A close read reveals how Fulton skillfully avoids any such implication.
Note how Fulton attributes the problem to Philadelphia’s “creation of a

145. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Fulton). Again, the key provision here was section
3.21 of the contract, which stated that providers could not reject prospective parents “unless
an exception is granted by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole
discretion.” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (2021) (quoting the contract).
On the basis of this quoted language, the Court exempted Catholic Social Services from the
rule, explaining that “the inclusion of a formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions in
section 3.21 renders the contractual non-discrimination requirement not generally applicable.”
Id. at 1879.
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formal mechanism for granting exceptions.”146 That “formal mechanism”
language is crucial; it suggests the problem lies in how Philadelphia
formalized its ability to make exceptions by putting it in writing. But that
makes Fulton of little use in a wide variety of day-to-day cases. Take a
Muslim girl whose school demands she take off her hijab during gym class.
The policy she wants to challenge will not be written down—and, even if it
were, it would probably not mention how officials could make exceptions to
it. This point carries over to a lot of run-of-the-mill free exercise cases—
Fulton will mean little for religious prisoners or religious employees, for
example, because the discretion of prisons and employers often tends to be
implied rather than explicit, and will often not be formalized in writing.
Or take Masterpiece Cakeshop and the need to find a secular exception
that one can use as the basis for claiming a religious exception. When rules
are formalized, and exceptions are hidden but discoverable, a strong litigation
team can go hunting for those exceptions and often find them. Recall how
the religious claimant in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, won his case,
at least in part, because of how the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
adjudicated three other cases brought by William Jack.147 But those three
other cases, it turns out, were unpublished. Even now, they are not on Lexis
or Westlaw.148 Jack Phillips had a great litigation team that went out,
discovered those adjudications, recognized their potential as “secular
exceptions,” and then turned them into the basis for Jack Phillips’s
constitutional claim. But without such a team, of course, Jack Phillips
probably would have lost. Religious claimants with resources may have a
relatively easy time winning religious exemptions. But folks without
resources may be in a different position. They may not have the resources to
bring suit at all; they certainly may not have the resources to bring the kind
of force necessary to win. It is important that we think about how Jews,
Muslims, and other religious minorities are going to fare in all this.
Indeed, if one looks again at Masterpiece Cakeshop, one sees another
striking thing. Again, Jack Phillips’s claim succeeded because of those
earlier cases brought by William Jack. But the William Jack cases were not
146. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1879 (emphasis added). The entire line from the Court is this:
“The creation of a formal mechanism for granting exceptions renders a policy not generally
applicable, regardless whether any exceptions have been given, because it ‘invites[s]’ the
government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of
solicitude . . . .” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
884 (1990)).
147. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing Fulton); see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (“The Commission’s disparate consideration of
Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same [kind of
discriminatory animus].”).
148. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. C.R. Div. Mar. 24, 2015),
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/GateauxDecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN4U-NE6V]; Jack v.
Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Colo. C.R. Div. Mar. 24,
2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/LeBakerySensualDecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUZ27ZW]; Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. C.R. Div. Mar. 24, 2015),
http://mediaassets.thedenverchannel.com/document/2015/04/23/Jack_Williams_V_Azucar_
Bakery_17228465_ver1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K6D-VV8U].
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mere happenstances. William Jack filed those lawsuits deliberately to help
Jack Phillips.149 Part of a cause popular in conservative Christian circles,
Jack Phillips needed help from his allies to get a religious exemption, and he
got that help from William Jack. This is a story equal parts happy and sad—
it is nice to have friends, of course. But questions of constitutional right
should not be decided on the basis of how many friends you have. And a
constitutional regime that allocates rights this way is incompatible with the
most basic notions of religious equality.150
Put these principles together, and you see a Free Exercise Clause shaped
in a way that best helps well-connected and well-funded parties fighting
culture-war issues. It ends up looking like a lesson about tax avoidance,
where complicated rules, opaque rules, and rules that require front-end
investigation all end up helping the powerful, while leaving everyone else
stranded. To be sure, these problems are endemic to law. Some (the rich,
the sophisticated, cultural insiders, religious majorities) will always find it
easier to enforce their rights than others (the less wealthy, the
unsophisticated, cultural outsiders, religious minorities). But in several
important ways, modern free exercise doctrine is making things worse and
not better.
CONCLUSION
“It would be rash in the extreme to make any predictions as to where the
majority of the Court may take First Amendment doctrine in deciding the
cases of the conscientious objectors.”151 Mark DeWolfe Howe wrote that
line in 1965, but it seems perpetually applicable. The Roberts Court is openly
pondering what it should do next with free exercise, and several justices have
invited suggestions. One thought is that maybe nothing needs to change. If
the Court can sufficiently protect free exercise within Smith, why not just do
that? If it ain’t broke, the saying goes, don’t fix it.
But Smith is indeed broken and it needs fixing, and it cannot be
satisfactorily fixed from the inside. The Court’s recent attempts to retcon
Smith into something that can protect religious exercise are noble; they are
certainly better than nothing. But the defects of that approach have become
149. Michael Gryboski, Christian Activist Denies Asking Colorado Bakery to Make ‘God
Hates Gays’ Cake, CHRISTIAN POST (Jan. 31, 2015), https://christianpost.com/news/christianactivist-denies-asking-colorado-bakery-to-make-god-hates-gays-cake-133368/
[https://perma.cc/34HL-24C5] (“[William] Jack explained to CP [(the Christian Post)] that his
ultimate point in requesting the cake and filing the complaint was to point out how
anti-discrimination law was being unequally applied to bakers . . . . ‘This statute is being
applied inequitably; it so far is only being applied against Christians, such as Jack Phillips and
Masterpiece Bakery.’” (quoting William Jack)). For a more pointed take, see Stephanie
Mencimer, Did the Supreme Court Fall for a Stunt?, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2018),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/06/did-the-supreme-court-fall-for-a-stunt/
[https://perma.cc/ZXV2-K2YY].
150. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982) (“Free exercise thus can be
guaranteed only when [people] accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to
small, new, or unpopular denominations.”).
151. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 166 (1965).
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increasingly clear. Years of cases have given us a doctrinal structure of
epicycles mounted upon epicycles—a clear sign it is time to throw out the
Ptolemaic model altogether and move on to the Copernican, whatever that
may be.

